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ABSTRACT
Even though one of the founding aspirations of our field was to foster
mutually beneficial exchanges between economics and philosophy,
economists never paid much attention to our work. Now that practicing
economists are increasingly engaging in explicit methodological
reflections, we can no longer comfort ourselves with the idea that
economists are simply not interested in discussions of methodological
issues. What is new on our side of the fence is that some of us
commend economists not to be distracted by the sort of philosophical
ideas we discuss in our work. While no one openly opposes this, it is
clear that others in our field strongly disagree with this. I argue that
what is ultimately at stake are different views on what philosophy of
economics is all about, what it should be and what it should do. I also
argue that these fundamental disagreements are better discussed








In 2008, Oxford University Press launched a series of handbooks in economic methodology. The first
handbook in the series was called ‘The Foundations of Positive and Norma4ntive Economics’ (Caplin
& Schotter, 2008). A second volume in the Series appeared in 2015 under the name of ‘Handbook of
Experimental Economic Methodology’ (Fréchette & Schotter, 2015). Anyone knowing that there
exists a field of economic methodology within economics, credited with its own JEL code B4,
might have expected that leading figures in the field would have been the main if not sole contri-
butors to the volumes. Except from Hausman (2008), however, there are no contributions of special-
ized economic methodologists in the volumes. The contributions almost all come from top
researchers in economics. What is more, reference to work done by specialized methodologists is
almost completely lacking.1
Anyoneonly superficially acquaintedwith thehistory of economicmethodologymight be tempted
to conclude there is really nothing new under the sun. Haven’t practicing economists always disre-
garded work done in economic methodology (see, e.g. Frey, 2001)?2 As Caplin and Schotter put it
in their Series Introduction ‘ …methodological reflections are widely seen as fruitless’ by economists
(Frey, 2001, p. xiii). Isn’t it time then to accept the persistent disinterest of practicing economists in our
work as a fact of life we have to live with? In this short paper, I will argue that this is not a forcedmove
for us.3 Of course, we can decide to abandon the aspiration to convince economists of the relevance of
our work. But we can also try harder to seize as yet unexploited opportunities to connect with the ‘ …
increasing signs ofmethodological ferment’ (Frey, 2001, p. xiii) in the economics profession. In order to
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do the latter, we should not only reach out more to economists. We should also be ready to no longer
avoid internal debate over fundamental issues currently dividing us.
A bit of historical context
Let me first sketch the spirit in which the then nascent field of economic methodology was founded.
The leading journals of the field, Economics & Philosophy, and The Journal of Economic Methodology
(and, before that, Methodus), both wanted to serve as a platform for systematic exchanges between
economics and philosophy. This left open which one was supposed to be the main beneficiary of the
exchange, economics or philosophy. But it was clear right from the start that a leading idea was that
economics could benefit from a closer engagement with philosophy. The almost unanimous way in
which methodologists opposed critiques of methodology such as Weintraub (1989) and Hahn (1992)
shows that the latter idea was very much at the heart of the new field. Without any exception, meth-
odologists were convinced that methodology is relevant for economics and that practicing econom-
ists should not think otherwise. One recurrent line of reasoning was that making methodological
decisions is both unavoidable in economics (and for any discipline, for that matter) and consequen-
tial for the sorts of theories that are constructed and accepted in it.4 The general feeling was that
conceding to Weintraub that methodology is irrelevant for economics would be tantamount to
denying the very raison d’être of the new field. And against Hahn methodologists held that econ-
omics could only benefit from explicit methodological discussion. How could anyone seriously
believe economics would be better off by leaving its methodological foundations unexamined?
There was a shared sense of several things. Let’s unpack them a bit. One of the field’s central goals
was to encourage methodological reflection among economists. Mäki (1994) disagreed with almost
everything Weintraub (1989) argued, but agreed that it would be good if economists developed
more critical self-consciousness. To further this, philosophy (and more in particular, philosophy of
science) was considered to be one of the main sources (if not the main or even only source) to draw
on. Economists and philosophers who specialized in economic methodology at the time, and who
also sometimes called themselves professed (or professional) methodologists (see, e.g. Hoover,
1995), predominantly looked at new insights in philosophy of science to shed light onmethodological
issues in economics. One such issue that got a lot of attention in the 1990s is how to appraise economic
theories and models (and especially what are the proper standards to apply in such appraisals).5 Pro-
fessedmethodologists saw it as oneof theirmain tasks to enlighten economists about the latest devel-
opments in philosophy. Economists should know about the reasons that led philosophers to move
beyond positivism (‘post-positivism’; Caldwell, 1982) and Popperianism (‘post-Popperianism’; De
Marchi, 1992), for example, and about what implications these developments had for how to assess
economic theories and scientific research programs in economics in the light of contravening empiri-
cal evidence. Backhouse’s paraphrase of Keynes nicely captures the spirit of the times
Practical economists, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any philosophical influ-
ences, are usually the slaves of some defunct methodologist. Crazy economists, who hear voices
in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some methodological guru of a few years back (with apolo-
gies to Keynes, 1936/1973; p. 383) – Backhouse (2010), p. 3.
Professed methodologists, in short, saw themselves as catalysts of explicit methodological discus-
sion in economics, as mediators between philosophy and economics, and sometimes also as experts
about the (un)tenability of particular methodologies adhered to by economists (as witnessed by
arguments to the extent that philosophical doctrines such as positivism, Popperianism, operational-
ism and instrumentalism that economists implicitly or explicitly endorsed are obsolete).
Especially the last part of this self-image might have amazed practicing economists. What made
professed methodologists believe that they had a comparative advantage over practicing econom-
ists in telling what ‘non-defunct’ methodology best promotes the growth of economic knowledge?
To professed methodologists, a ‘non-defunct’ methodology (such as post-positivist Lakatosianism)
basically meant a methodology that is consistent with the latest insights in the philosophy of
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science. This might have been so self-evident to them that they saw no reason to explicitly state it.
But to a practicing economist this might not have been obvious at all. Just being exposed to argu-
ments that somemethodology is superior on philosophical grounds was not nearly enough for them
to abandon their allegedly defunct methodologies (such as operationalism and instrumentalism) as
‘dead ends’. Hence responses by economists in the spirit of ‘It takes a theory to beat a theory’. Econ-
omists typically (‘qua economists’) are not interested in the philosophical credentials of method-
ologies per se; they are only interested in methodological discussion in so far as methodological
discussion is germane to their immediate concerns. If they believe their theories are in a good
shape, they will see no need for methodological reflection (‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’). Furthermore,
like recipes, methodologies that look good on the drawing board (or ‘in theory’) might disappoint
when actually tried.6 The proof of the pudding is in the eating, as the saying goes. One is reminded
here of Fisher’s (1933) and Samuelson’s (1983) denunciations that professed methodologists typi-
cally have been unable to erect better theories on the basis of their own methodological advice. Pro-
fessed methodologists might of course respond by arguing that the very point of their specialization
is that they do not engage in theory development themselves. And in so far as economists believe
there is nothing wrong with their theories, professed methodologists might be tempted to unmask
this as circular complacency: small wonder that economists are satisfied with their theories if they
use the same criteria for assessing the quality of their theories as they use in developing their the-
ories. But absent evidence that their favored methodologies lead to better economic theories, to the
typical economist the question remains what made professed methodologists so sure that their
favored methodology is superior to the defunct methodologies they are supposed to supplant.7
What’s new?
It is tempting to believe that not much has changed in how both practicing economists and pro-
fessed methodologists look at the (ir)relevance of economic methodology since the 1990s.
Indeed, economists have remained steadfast in disregarding and ignoring work done by professed
methodologists. And professed methodologists still seem to cling to the belief that their work is rel-
evant for economics. But appearances might be deceiving here. I will argue that underneath, mostly
publicly undiscussed also by professed methodologists, several things have changed. I will briefly
discuss a few of them.
Going against Hahn’s advice, there is much more explicit discussion of methodological issues by
practicing economists now than in the 1990s. These discussions do not pertain only to small m
methodological issues, but also to more general and abstract issues, such as the epistemic
status of models and their use in economics (see e.g. Rodrik, 2015 and Gilboa et al., 2014). It
seems partly these discussions by economists have been spurred as a response to the financial
crisis, partly they were also a response to methodological issues popping up from within the dis-
cipline (such as how reliable and generalizable findings in lab experiments are, as in Fréchette &
Schotter, 2015).8 Unfortunately, we cannot boast that the efforts and work done by professed
methodologists contributed to this. There is evidence that these had almost no impact. With
only a few exceptions, reference to the work done by professed methodologists is conspicuously
lacking in these discussions. Occasionally there are direct references to general ideas from philos-
ophy, but the work done by us, as self-proclaimed mediators between philosophy and economics,
is mostly ignored.
For sure, professedmethodologists have not ceased to engage also in explicit methodological dis-
cussion. Instead of having one discourse on economic methodology in the 1990s, with almost only
professedmethodologists as participants, it seemswenowhave twoparallel discourses (i.e. discourses
that do not connectwith each other), one inwhich only professionalmethodologists partake, and one
in which only economists partake. One could argue that the field of economic methodology is more
productive and vibrant than ever. But on this side also several things seem to have changed. It is not
clear anymore that contributing tomore critical self-consciousness among economists is still seen as a
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central goal of our field. It seems that the intended audience of our work gradually shifted frompracti-
cing economists to philosophers (mainly to philosophers of science and philosophers of social
science). Quite a few of us do not seem to care so much anymore about economists finding our
work irrelevant for their own work. Back in the 1990s, this was seen by professed methodologists as
a failure of their nascent field, now it seems the persistent disregard of our work by economists is
mostly met by resignation on our side. Instead of contributing to the advancement of economics
by bringing in insights from philosophy of science, it seems we now primarily want to contribute to
the advancement of philosophy of science by taking examples from economics as a case study. Our
research questions seem to be increasingly set by central research questions in philosophy of
science (such as triangulation, evidence-based policy). Relatedly, it seems that our self-understanding
(and self-identification) also shifted from being contributors to methodology in economics to philo-
sophers specialized in economics. Rather than locating ourselves in between the two disciplines of
economics and philosophy, most of us now position themselves squarely within philosophy.
What is perhaps the most remarkable new development in our own field is that some of us pro-
fessed methodologists have started to advise economists not to engage with abstract philosophical
ideas. These are philosophers (or: methodologists trained as philosophers) advising economists not
to waste time with discussing abstract philosophical issues. This was inconceivable in the old times.
Only an economist, such as Hahn (or a historian of economics, such as Weintraub) could have
advised this. For methodologists the relevance if not urgency of discussing these issues was
beyond doubt. So it seems the table has been turned on this issue.
Let me give an example. Back in the nineties economic methodologists were pleased to see that
at least some economists recognized the significance of the Duhem-Quine thesis for how outcomes
of empirical tests of economic theories should be interpreted (see, e.g. Cross, 1982 and also, more
recently, Kay & King, 2020 and Skidelsky, 2020). Economists might be surprised to see one of the
most vocal current spokesmen of economic methodology, Don Ross, argue that economists
should not overrate the importance of the thesis for their own concerns (Ross, 2011). In his
review of Bardsley et al. (2009), called ‘Methodology for experiments should be determined empiri-
cally, not philosophically’, Ross advises economists against spending too much thought on musing
about what the implications of the Duhem-Quine thesis should be for their own practice.
… even these apparently uncontroversial ideas from philosophy of science risk overpowering subtle problems
emerging specifically from experimental economics; apparently harmless traces of philosophy risk souring the
scientific milk. (Ross, 2011, p. 189)
It is as if we are hearing echoes from Weintraub – small m-methodology is relevant, but Big M-meth-
odology isn’t –but this time voicedby the sort of ‘outsider-philosopher’ thatWeintraubwas criticizing.
At first sight, this might seem puzzling and at odds with my observation that we increasingly self-
identify as philosophers. But in fact, it is neither in conflict with this observation, nor it is new in econ-
omic methodology. Ross is an outspoken representative of a school in philosophy (or in meta-phil-
osophy, as some would be inclined to argue), naturalism (see Ladyman & Ross, 2009), that already
had adherents among professed methodologists back in the 1990s such as Alex Rosenberg
(1992). Naturalism comes in many different versions, but a common denominator seems to be the
belief that philosophical problems are better approached and, if possible, solved by scientific
methods than by traditional philosophical methods (such as conceptual analysis). Indeed, Wade
Hands already proclaimed as early as in 2001 that economic methodologists had shunned founda-
tionalism and embraced naturalism. This might have been premature, however, because natural-
ism’s opposite in philosophy, foundationalism, never was completely dead and buried in
economic methodology (and, more broadly, in philosophy) and might even be enjoying a revival
lately (with work on social ontology, such as Epstein, 2015). Ross might be one of our most vocal
spokesmen, his thoroughgoing naturalist view on the proper relation between philosophy and econ-
omics is surely not shared by all philosophers of economics.
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Disagreements all around?
In fact, there is more pervasive disagreement among philosophers of economics nowadays than first
meets the eye. These disagreements do not pertain only to what school of philosophy to draw inspi-
ration from, and to the related issue of what the proper relations should be between philosophy and
economics. The disagreement extends also to what sorts of issues are the most central or important
ones to address. As I already indicated above, our research agenda seems to be increasingly set by
the sorts of issues prevailing in general philosophy of science (such as explanation, evidence,
measurement, expertise, triangulation). But there are also philosophers of economics, whose
research agenda is set more by issues popping up in ongoing debates in economics (and more in
particular in specific branches of economics, such as behavioral economics).9
Perhaps the most pervasive disagreement in current philosophy of economics is about the very
fundamental issue of what philosophy of economics is all about, what it should be and what it
should do.10 It is clear that the normative ‘theory appraisal’ tradition that prevailed for a while in
the 1990s is dead and buried. But it is much less clear what has come in its place. Ross’s advice to
economists to turn even further away from discussing grand abstract philosophical ideas and doc-
trines of course raises the issue of what then should be the central task of philosophy of economics.
His answer seems to be that philosophers of economics should try to find out what sorts of ideas and
insights obtained in economics, amidst of contributions from other neighboring disciplines such as
psychology and sociology, could contribute to a grand, coherent metaphysical picture of reality (also
called a project of interdisciplinary unification in Ross, 2014).11 Here economics (‘as-it-is’ and what it
delivered so far) seems to serve primarily as valuable input to the project of philosophy of economics
(as conceived of by Ross), rather than as the recipient or beneficiary of philosophy of economics. But
those philosophers of economics working in the tradition of social ontology such as Epstein seem to
cling to a more traditional understanding of what philosophy of economics should be aiming at: con-
fronting economists with ideas and insights from philosophy. Indeed, the main thrust of this project
seems to be that there cannot be adequate economics unless it is made consistent with insights
obtained in social ontology.
I suggested that not toomany of us seem to be concerned anymore about economists finding our
work irrelevant for their own work. The work done by social ontologists and others (such as critical
realists) shows that this does not mean that most of us now believe that our work is irrelevant for
economics. Quite to the contrary: some of us still seem to think that practicing economists would
benefit from paying attention to our work. It is clear that we have not been able to convince
most economists of this. For quite some time, we could perhaps comfort ourselves with the idea
that it makes no sense to try to convince economists of the relevance of our methodological analyses
and discussions, because they are simply not interested in explicit methodological discussion. But
now that economists themselves increasingly engage in explicit methodological discussion, this
explanation won’t suffice. Are we really trying hard to convince economists of the relevance of
our work? Even practicing economists who do show an interest in philosophy of economics, such
as Sugden (2016), are put off by the reluctance of philosophers of economics such as Epstein to
really engage with economics and economists. What Sugden takes issue with in particular is not
only that Epstein makes no serious attempt to identify the ontological assumptions built into con-
crete theories advanced by economists, but also that Epstein clings to foundationalism, the belief
that philosophers are in a better position than economists to discover the correct ontological foun-
dations for economics.12
Philosophers of economics sometimes lament that if only economists made the effort to look at
our work, they would recognize that it is of interest to them. What is often mentioned in this
regard is that there has been a descriptive turn in economic methodology after the normative
theory appraisal era (see, e.g. Davis & Hands, 2011, p. 1). Rather than discussing how economic the-
ories should ideally be appraised, spurred among others by McCloskey and Klamer’s rhetoric of econ-
omics project, many methodologists turned to analyzing actual practice in economics. Without
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denying that there has been something like a descriptive turn in economic methodology, it seems
normative aspirations were never completely abandoned. Despite their huge differences, Ross and
Epstein both acknowledge that their projects are unabashedly normative. More importantly, why
would economists be more interested in descriptive studies of their own practices? Have we ever
asked them? For sure, Sugden would have liked to see Epstein engage in more serious discussion
of the ontological assumptions in concrete economic models. But not as a laudable goal in and by
itself, it seems, but rather as a necessary requisite for serious normative discussion of ontological
issues in economics. It seems the problems Sugden has with philosophical analyses like Epstein’s is
not that they are normative, but that they are rather speculative and poorly informed about econ-
omics. It is not the normativity of Epstein’s project as such that Sugden is rallying against, but
rather Epstein’s conviction that he, as a philosopher, is in a superior position to lay out adequate onto-
logical foundations for economics.13
Takingsomemoredistancenow, imaginewhat impressionaneconomistwouldgetofourfield if she
wereto lookmoreclosely intowhathasbeenpublishedover the lastyears in journals suchasTheJournal
of Economic Methodology and Economics and Philosophy. The economist would likely be amazed,
puzzled and perhaps even bewildered by the great variety of papers. As indicated above, there is a
great plurality and diversity not only in subjects addressed, but also in the ways they are addressed.
There is also great diversity in fundamental views on how philosophy and economics should relate to
each other and on what philosophers of economics should be doing. Some of us might want to
cherish this in terms of ‘intellectual wealth’, reflecting a refreshing lack of mono-culture and as a
healthy form of pluralism in our field. But the economist might be rather amazed by the lack of unity
or convergence also in style and approach. Occasionally, she might stumble across a paper or two
that interest her. But she would see no sign of an established view, or received wisdom, or an agreed
upon corpus of knowledge. If the economist would consult a textbook in philosophy of economics to
see what wisdom has been accumulated in the field, she is likely to be disappointed. And she might
perhaps be even more disappointed if she consult several of these. She might wonder whether there
is anything at all that all the papers and textbooks have in common. Or the economist might simply
nodandsigh,wonderingwhether this ishowtheyaredoingthings inphilosophy.Atanyrate, it isdoubt-
ful that it would help in convincing economists that our work is worth paying attention to.
Conclusion
One of the original aims of the field of economic methodology was to stimulate critical self-con-
sciousness among economists. What about our own critical self-consciousness? It looks as if philo-
sophers of economics evade explicit discussion of, and public debate over, the internal
disagreements about the underpinnings of their own field. This is not a recent phenomenon. As I
argued above, in the founding years there also was no public reflection by professed methodologists
on how their work could contribute to the advancement of economics. But at least there was a sense
of unity in terms of our mission: by enlightening economists about the latest insights from philos-
ophy (and from philosophy of science, in particular), we thought we could contribute to finding
better, non-defunct methodologies for economics. Now even that is called into question by some
of us. The disagreements about almost anything that matters in our field run deeper now. Isn’t it
time to face these disagreements and to discuss them openly and publicly?
Notes
1. This did not prevent Hands (2009), Ross (2010), Moscati (2010) and Guala (2017), some of our top methodolo-
gists, from highly praising the quality of the volumes in their reviews. In my view, it is telling that especially Ross
(2010, p. 88) and Guala (2017, p. 113) suggest that the overall quality of these volumes is high not despite, but
because of the lack of reference to literature in economic methodology and philosophy. More on this later.
2. It can be argued that this is true only (or at most) for ‘mainstream’ (or ‘orthodox’) economists. Heterodox econ-
omists arguably have always been more open to methodological reflection. In this short paper, I will leave out
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the discussion of ‘methodologies of heterodox economics’ because tight space constraints prevent me from
doing so.
3. ‘Us’, meaning the community of philosophers of economics. In the paper, I will follow the current practice to no
longer speak of the field of ‘economic methodology’ but of the field of ‘philosophy of economics’, leaving aside
the issue here of what are their differences (see Binder et al., 2017).
4. Hoover (1995, p. 715) succinctly put it as follows: ‘ … since methodological considerations are unavoidable,
effort should be directed at good methodology’.
5. Blaug (1980/1992) was one of the principal instigators of this normative ‘theory appraisal’ episode in economic
methodology. With his ‘Big M-methodology is irrelevant for economics’ critique, Weintraub clearly targeted this
variant of economic methodology. Weintraub does not deny the relevance of small m-methodology (see also
Boland, 2001).
6. Actually, thinking of methodologies in terms of recipes might be misleading, precisely for the reason that unlike
recipes, methodologies might not provide positive heuristics as to how to build theories and models.
7. Professed methodologists might be tempted to argue that their favorite methodology reflects ‘good practice’ in
other sciences (preferably successful, uncontested science – e.g., Popper thought that with his falsificationism he
reflected the main thrust of Einstein’s work). But it increasingly transpired that methodologies (and philosophies
of science) are at best idealizations and at worst serious distortions of actual practice in science.
8. One might wonder whether this is really something new in economics: it can be argued that economists always
engaged in explicit methodological discussion whenever they saw a pressing or urgent need to do so.
9. This is regarded by Ross and Kincaid (2009) as one of the hallmarks of what they call ‘new philosophy of econ-
omics’. Apart from the fact that there was already philosophy of economics with this ‘new’ orientation in the old
days (see Aydinonat, 2011), not all of current philosophy of economics seems to have the ‘new’ orientation.
10. In line with current practice in our field, I switch here from discussing economic methodology to discussing phil-
osophy of economics. Arguably, philosophy of economics is broader than economic methodology, as it also
comprises ethics and political philosophy (and their relations with economics). Here I will stay focused on the
economic methodology part of philosophy of economics.
11. Amore radical implicationof a thoroughgoingnaturalismmight be to startworking as a practicing economist. This
is indeedwhat, for example, Ross (in Harrison et al., 2017), Guala et al. (2013) and Bicchieri (2006) have been doing.
12. Sugden also notes that many economists would find the sorts of ontological issues Epstein addresses abstruse
and of little interest to their concerns.
13. An interesting possibility is that economists have no special dislike for methodologists and philosophers but are
‘insular’ (Fourcade et al., 2015; see also Düppe, 2011) in a more general sense, in that they do not connect with
any other discipline or field. Angrist et al.’s (2020) attempt to rebut Fourcade et al. on this point is not very con-
vincing, as it only shows that only psychologists are a bit less insular than economists.
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